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A B S T R A C T   
Result Based Financing (RBF) has been implemented in health systems across low and middle-income countries 
(LMICs), with the objective of improving population health. Most evaluations of RBF schemes have focused on 
average programme effects for incentivised services. There is limited evidence on the potential effect of RBF on 
health outcomes, as well as on the heterogeneous effects across socio-economic groups and time periods. This 
study analyses the effect of Zimbabwe’s national RBF scheme on neonatal, infant and under five mortality, using 
Demographic and Health Survey data from 2005, 2010 and 2015. We use a difference in differences design, 
which exploits the staggered roll-out of the scheme across 60 districts. We examine average programme effects 
and perform sub-group analyses to assess differences between socio-economic groups. We find that RBF reduced 
under-five mortality by two percentage points overall, but that this decrease was only significant for children of 
mothers with above median wealth (2.7 percentage points) and education (2.1 percentage points). RBF increased 
institutional delivery by seven percentage points – with a statistically significant effect for poorer socio-economic 
groups and least educated. We also find that RBF reduced c-section rates by three percentage points. We find no 
detectable effect of RBF on other incentivised services. When considering programme effects over time, we find 
that effects were only observed during the second phase of the programme (March 2012) with the exception of c- 
sections, which only reduced in the longer term. Further research is needed to examine whether these findings 
can be generalised to other settings.   
1. Introduction 
Ensuring high quality healthcare is an ongoing challenge for low and 
middle-income countries (LMICs). Low levels of provider effort 
(Mohanan et al., 2015), high rates of absenteeism (Miller and Babiarz, 
2014), poor governance, limited financial resources (Dieleman et al., 
2016), and shortages in equipment, drugs and medical supplies have 
been identified as key constraints (Borghi et al., 2018). Based on a recent 
review (Singh et al., 2021), 41 LMICs have implemented some form of 
Results Based Financing (RBF),1 with the hope of improving quality of 
care and health outcomes (Witter, Bertone, & al., 2019a, 2019b; Ver-
meersch et al., 2012). RBF schemes provide financial rewards or 
penalties to healthcare providers, conditional on the achievement of 
pre-specified performance targets (Meessen and Sekabaraga, 2011). 
Agency relationships between patients, healthcare providers and payers, 
coupled with asymmetric information problems, provide a theoretical 
rationale for the use of financial incentives to target specific behaviours 
(Fichera et al., 2014). In LMICs, RBF has often been implemented as a 
bundle of interventions which combine financial rewards with, for 
example, training, governance and financial management reforms and 
performance monitoring (Witter, Fretheim, Kessy, & al., 2012; Kovacs 
et al., 2020). 
Much of the literature evaluating RBF schemes implemented in 
LMICs, has focused on measuring programme effects for incentivised 
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services (Witter, Bertone, & al., 2019a, 2019b; Borghi et al., 2018). Even 
though improving health outcomes is often the ultimate goal of RBF 
schemes, few studies examine programme effects on health outcomes in 
LMICs – in contrast to high-income settings (Kristensen et al., 2014; 
Ryan et al., 2016; Jha et al., 2012). As far as we are aware, only four 
studies in LMICs have examined the effect of RBF on child mortality 
using quasi-experimental or experimental approaches (Huillery and 
Seban, 2021; Vinuela, 2015; van de Poel, Flores and O’Donnell, 2016; 
Gage and Bauhoff, 2021). Two studies have measured programme ef-
fects on child anthropometric outcomes in Rwanda (Gertler and Ver-
meersch, 2013) and in the Philippines (Peabody et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the previous RBF evaluation in Zimbabwe focused on 
the pilot, with less evidence on the programme effects operating at scale 
(except for a recent cross-country evaluation by Gage and Bauhoff, 
2021). Many other studies have measured effects at a single point in 
time, after two to three years, with less evidence of longer-term effects 
(World Bank, 2016). However, many factors can limit programme 
effectiveness during scale-up, meaning that results observed from pilot 
programmes may not reflect those of national programmes. Further-
more, evidence from higher income settings suggests effects can evolve 
over time, as providers get used to incentives (Kristensen et a., 2014; 
Ryan et al., 2016; Jha et al., 2012; Shroff et al., 2017; Zomahoun et al., 
2019). There is also limited evidence as to the heterogeneity of effects 
across contexts and population groups, with mixed effects across coun-
tries and service types (Bynyaruka et al, 2018, 2020; Ridde et al., 2018). 
We investigate the effect of Zimbabwe’s national RBF scheme on 
child health outcomes (i.e. neonatal, infant and under five mortality) 
using national survey data from 2005, 2010 and 2015. We also examine 
changes in the delivery of incentivised services, as well as heterogeneity 
across population sub-groups. 
2. Background 
2.1. Study setting 
Health care in Zimbabwe is mostly publicly funded and provided by 
1533 health care facilities across 62 districts (The Ministry of Health and 
Child Care, 2016). Government funding for health reduced substantially 
during the 2007 economic crisis with budget allocations of 7 USD per 
capita in 2009, a quarter of health programmes funded through external 
aid, and 39% of expenditure supported by household out of pocket 
expenditure (Witter et al., 2019a, 2019b) (The Ministry of Health and 
Child Welfare, 2010). 
Three quarters of the annual deaths in Zimbabwe are attributable to 
communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional diseases (World 
Health Organization, 2018). In the early 2000s under five mortality was 
about 91 per 1000 live births in Zimbabwe declining to 73.8 in 2012 
(World Bank Data, 2019). The institutional delivery rate was 72.2% in 
1999, declining in the early 2000s and then increasing again in 2015 to 
77%. 
2.2. The RBF programme 
In September 2010, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) in collab-
oration with the World Bank accepted an initial $15 million grant 
conditional on the implementation of RBF. RBF was adopted to support 
the Zimbabwe National Health Strategy 2009–2013, the Investment 
Case for The Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, 2010–2012, and to 
revive decentralization efforts as part of a stalled results-based man-
agement programme initiated by GoZ in 2004. The stated goal of RBF in 
Zimbabwe was “to increase the availability, accessibility and utilization of 
quality health care services to improve maternal, new born and child health” 
supporting the 2009–2013 Zimbabwe National Health Strategy and its 
Investment Case for The Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, 
2010–2012 (The Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, 2010). 
The RBF program incentivises 16 maternal and child health service 
indicators at the primary care level (Rural Health Centres) and six ser-
vices at the district hospital level (Table 1). 
We describe the programme using the framework by Kovacs et al. 
(2020). The RBF scheme measures the performance of facilities and 
quarterly payments are made directly to these facilities. From July 2011 
to July 2012 all l payments were used to support service delivery and 
facility improvements. After July 2012, a quarter of payments could be 
used to pay staff a bonus, with the remainder supporting service delivery 
according to facility plans. Provincial and District Health Managers were 
also eligible for bonus payments related to the delivery of quarterly 
supervision tasks (Brown et al., 2020). 
Three criteria constitute the basis for payment. First, a unit price is 
attached to each service indicator (Table 1). Indicators such as ‘delivery 
with complications’ ($80 pre 2013) and ‘caesarean section’ ($140) were 
given the highest, whilst the indicator ‘vitamin A given to a child’ was 
assigned the lowest price ($0.18) amongst the indicators that are 
measurable in our data. Whilst institutional deliveries are performed 
and paid under the RBF in both primary and secondary health care fa-
cilities, C-sections are not performed in primary care facilities which are 
not paid for them either. Second, facilities in remote areas are eligible 
for an additional remoteness bonus (up to 30% of the first amount). 
Third, a balanced score card measured structural and process quality 
(this was updated to a quality checklist in 2014), resulting in a bonus of 
up to 25 percent of the total value earned from the first and second part. 
In terms of gaming safeguards, quarterly external verifications were 
replaced in 2013 with a risk-based verification strategy conducted by 
the National Purchasing Agent (NPA), which targets facilities with 
routine reporting of errors or inconsistent performance outcomes. Local 
quality control is safeguarded by independent field officers (Sisters in 
Charge of Community) who report to NPAs, with supervision by District 
Health Executives (Kadungure et al., 2021; World Bank, Cordaid and 
Ministry of Health and Child Care, 2013; World Bank, 2013). 
Alongside RBF, user fees were removed, and the facility bonus was 
used to increase maternity wards and purchase new equipment (Brown 
et al., 2020). 
2.3. Rollout of RBF in Zimbabwe 
Fig. 1 shows the rollout of the scheme. RBF was implemented in three 
phases. In Phase One, RBF started in the districts of Marondera and 
Zvishavane from July 2011 to March 2012 (henceforth “early adopters”). 
In Phase Two, from March 2012 to June 2014, RBF was rolled out to 16 
additional rural districts (referred to as “mid adopters”). In Phase Three, 
in July 2014 RBF was rolled out to the remaining 42 districts and an 
urban voucher system was introduced in two cities (Harare and Bula-
wayo) in April 2014 (referred to as “late adopters”). Phase One and Two 
were largely financed by the World Bank ($50 million) with co-funding 
from the Government of Zimbabwe ($13.5 million). Cordaid was the 
programme NPA. Phase Three RBF rollover to the 42 districts was 
financed from a pooled multi-donor Health Transition Fund and Health 
Development Fund ($350 million) with Crown Agents acting as the NPA 
for the new districts (Cordaid remained NPA for their existing districts). 
National oversight is maintained by a multi-stakeholder National 
Steering Committee chaired by the Ministry of Health. 
In our analysis, we classify districts as early (phase One, on or after 
July 1, 2011), mid (phase Two, on or after March 1, 2012) and late 
adopters (phase Three, on or after July 1, 2014). In the main analysis we 
compare mid and late adopters, excluding early adopters, although early 
adopters are included in robustness checks. A map of the RBF districts 
and the time when RBF was rolled out is displayed in Fig. 2. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Data 
We use three waves of data from the Zimbabwe Demographic and 
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Health Survey (ZDHS): 2005, 2010 and 2015. The ZDHS is a nationally 
representative cross-sectional survey. Its sample was selected using a 
stratified, two-stage cluster design. All women aged 15–49 and men 
aged 15–54 who were either permanent residents of the selected 
households or visitors who stayed in the household the night before the 
interview were eligible to participate. The ZDHS included 10,800 in 
2005, 10,828 households in 2010, and 11,196 in 2015. 
3.2. Outcomes 
Our analysis examines the effects of the RBF programme on under- 
five mortality (<5 years), infant mortality (<1 year) and neonatal 
mortality (<1 month). We focus on women who gave birth in the five 
years prior to the interview, and use data on their most recent birth, 
their last child and their household characteristics, and where relevant, 
the age of death. We use this information to derive binary indicators for 
deaths before the age of five, within 12 months and within one month of 
birth. 
We also measure programme effects on outcomes which may impact 
mortality: birthweight and anthropometric measures. Economists have 
used birthweight to measure neonatal health as a way to explain both 
the intergenerational transmission of health as well as the transmission 
of advantage in an individual’s life course. Although with its limitations, 
birthweight is a proxy for the size of the foetus, particularly abdominal 
circumference (Conti et al., 2020). However, literature suggests that 
additional measures such as anthropometric scores should be used to 
measure child growth (Conti et al., 2020). Anthropometric measures 
Table 1 




Zimbabwe Demographic and 
Health Survey measurement of the 
indicator 
Antenatal Care (ANC) 
Antenatal care visits (4 times) 
[Rural Health Centre] 
3.00 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if number of ANC 
visits is equal to or bigger than 
four;  
- Equal to zero if number of ANC 
visits is less than four 
First ANC visit during the first 16 
weeks of pregnancy [Rural 
Health Centre] 
3.00 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if first ANC visit 
occurred on or before 16 weeks 
of pregnancy;  
- Equal to zero if first ANC visit 
occurred after 16 weeks of 
pregnancy 
High Risk Maternal cases referral 
out [District Hospital] 
3.00  
ARV prophylaxis to HIV +
pregnant woman [Rural Health 
Centre] 
2.00  
Pregnant woman tested for HIV 
(first test) [Rural Health 
Centre] 
2.00 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if tested for HIV as 
part of ANC;  
- Equal to zero if not tested for 
HIV as part of ANC 
Pregnant woman received two or 
more Tetanus Toxoid (TT2+) 
vaccinations [Rural Health 
Centre] 
2.00 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if number of TT2 
vaccinations is equal to or bigger 
than two;  
- Equal to zero if if number of TT2 
vaccinations is less than two 
Pregnant woman screened for 
syphilis [Rural Health Centre] 
0.45  
Pregnant woman received 
Malaria prevention 2 times 
Intermittent Preventive 
Treatment (IPT) when 




Caesarean section [Rural Health 
Centre] 
140.00 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if woman delivered 
by caesarean (i.e. they cut belly 
to take baby out) in a health 
institution;  
- Equal to zero if woman 
delivered by vaginal delivery 
Delivery with complication, no 
caesarean section needed 
[District Hospital] 
80.00  
Delivery attended by skilled 
health worker (nurse/midwife 
or doctor) in health institution 
[District Hospital] 
25.00 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if delivery was 
assisted by a health personnel 
(doctor/nurse/midwife) and 
took place in a health institution 
(e.g. district/central/provincial 
hospital, urban, municipal 
clinic, rural health centre);  
- Equal to zero if delivery was not 
assisted by a health personnel 
(doctor/nurse/midwife) and/or 
did not take place in a health 
institution 
Postnatal Care (PNC) 
Vitamin A given to a child 6–59 
months [Rural Health Centre] 
0.18 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if in the last six 
months child between six and 59 
months was given a vitamin A 
dose;  
- Equal to zero if in the last six 
months child between six and 59 
months was not given a vitamin 
A dose  




Zimbabwe Demographic and 
Health Survey measurement of the 
indicator 
Growth Monitoring child < 5 
years [Rural Health Centre] 
0.18  
Malnutrition child < 5 years 
[District Hospital] 
3.00  
Postnatal care visit (2 times) 
[Rural Health Centre] 
3.00 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if number of PNC 
visits is equal to or bigger than 
two between 10 days and 2 
months of delivery;  
- Equal to zero if number of PNC 
visits is less than two between 
10 days and 2 months of 
delivery 
First and repeat visits for long/ 
short term family planning 
methods (IUDs or Implants; 
Oral or Injectables) [Rural 
Health Centre] 
52.50 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if women aged 
15–49 receive short term (oral 
or injectables) or long term 
(intrauterine devices or 
implants) family planning 
methods;  
- Equal to zero if women aged 
15–49 do not receive short or 
long term family planning 
methods. 
Women 15–49 years old who 
underwent a Tuba litigation 
[District Hospital] 
30.00  
Patients visiting health facility for 
new consultation/disease 
[Rural Health Centre] 
0.16  
Immunisation 
Child < 1 year fully immunised 
(e.g. received BCG, Penta3, 
OPV 3 and measles) [Rural 
Health Centre] 
3.50 Dummy variable:  
- Equal to one if child younger 
than one year has been fully 
immunised;  
- Equal to zero if if child younger 
than one year has not been fully 
immunised 
Note: the indicators that are shaded in grey are measured in the Zimbabwean 
DHS. 
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using height account for health and nutrition since conception (Gertler 
et al., 2013). Birth weight is based on written records or, when not 
available, on a measure provided by the mother. We estimate z-scores 
for weight-for-height, height-for-age and weight-for-age with z-scores 
less than − 2 indicating wasting, stunting, and underweight, respectively 
(O’Donnell et al., 2008). 
Lastly, we investigate programme effects on the set of services and 
behaviours that are targeted by the RBF programme and measurable in 
the DHS: receipt of four or more ante-natal care (ANC) visits, having the 
first ANC visit before 16 weeks of pregnancy, receipt of two or more 
tetanus injections, testing for HIV, skilled birth attendance, c-section 
rate, receipt of two or more post-natal (PNC) visits between 10 days and 
two months after delivery, receipt of vitamin A by mother or child be-
tween six and 59 months, receipt of short term (oral or injectables) or 
long term (intrauterine devices or implants) family planning methods 
during postnatal care, and child full immunisation (i.e. received the full 
course of vaccination for Bacillus Calmette-Guérin tuberculosis vaccine, 
Penta3, oral polio vaccine and measles within 12 months from birth). 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main outcomes 
before and after the introduction of RBF for mid (on or after March 1, 
2012) and late adopters (on or after July 1, 2014). Prior to the start of 
RBF, mortality, related health outcomes and service delivery outcomes 
were generally similar between mid and late adopters. However, insti-
tutional deliveries and immunisation coverage were higher in late than 
mid adopters (Table 2). 
3.3. Heterogeneity and controls 
We examine whether RBF has differential effects across socio- 
Fig. 1. Timeline of the roll out of RBF in Zimbabwe 
Source: Adapted from (World Bank, 2016). 
Fig. 2. RBF participating districts.  
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economic groups, measured in terms of household wealth (via the DHS 
wealth index)2 as well as mother’s education. 
We control for a range of individual and household demographic and 
socioeconomic variables that can impact service delivery and health 
outcomes: wealth quintiles, mother’s education and religion, mother 
and household head age, rural location, province, whether the individ-
ual has a car, household size and the number of births in the past five 
years. 
Prior to the introduction of RBF, households in mid adopter districts 
generally had lower levels of education, higher poverty levels, and were 
further from facilities and more rural than households in late adopter 
districts (Table 3). Households were comparable on other variables. 
3.4. Matching households to districts 
We matched households to facilities using geographical coordinates 
for all facilities in the country provided by the Ministry of Health and 
Child Care and (displaced3) geo-coordinates of the villages (clusters) 
where households lived in the DHS (Fig. 3). Using these coordinates, we 
calculate distances between each DHS cluster and health facility, and 
then match the DHS cluster to the closest health facility (using ArcGIS 
10.4). Using the location of the health facility, we locate the relevant 
district and, therefore, exposure to RBF. On average, households are 
about 4.5 km away from their closest health facility (Table 3). 
4. Methods 
4.1. Empirical strategy 
We exploit the differential timing of the introduction of RBF across 
districts to investigate its effect on health outcomes and service delivery. 
We estimate the following difference-in-differences linear models: 
yidt =α + βRBFd + γXit + δτ + μh + εidt (1)  
where i indicates the mother and d is the district where the mother i is 
located, and t is the year of the survey, 2005, 2010 and 2015. The 
outcome variables yidt indicate each of the health and service delivery 
outcomes, reported by mother i in survey year t for her last child (born in 
the last five years), living in district d. We include dummies, δτ, equal to 
one if the conception date is on or after March 1, 2012 (for those residing 
in mid adopter districts) or on or after July 1, 2014 (for those residing in 
late adopter districts) and zero otherwise; RBFd is equal to one if 
conception date was on or after the date of introduction of RBF in the 
district, where mother i ‘s closest health facility is located.4 Hence, there 
is temporal variation in the introduction of RBF, as well as individual- 
level variation in the timing of birth and choice of health facility.5 
Equation (1) excludes the two districts that implemented RBF during the 
first phase. These districts were not randomly selected and differed from 
the other districts in their baseline health outcomes. In order to avoid 
biases from endogenous selection into the treatment due to character-
istics we do not capture with the DHS, we exclude them from our main 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics – health outcomes and service delivery by participating 
districts.   
Mid adopters Late adopters 
before after Before after 
Health outcomes: 



































































Health service delivery: 


































Note: weighted samples. Mean and % displayed, std. Dev. In () and sample sizes 
in [], excluding early adopters. Infant mortality indicates mortality under 12 
months. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics – household characteristics.   
Mid adopters Late adopters 
before after Before after 
















Female head of household 37.99% 36.99% 38.34% 37.54% 








Rural 79.64% 76.90% 62.92% 71.83% 
Christian 79.63% 87.46% 84.47% 89.22% 
















Owns a Motorbike 1.06% 2.80% 1.22% 2.01% 
Owns a Car 4.74% 8.72% 9.17% 10.05% 
Owns a Bike 26.53% 28.83% 24.39% 21.25% 








Poorest wealth quintile 31.42% 32.77% 18.67% 23.69% 
Poorer 2nd wealth quintile 21.73% 19.03% 19.05% 21.01% 
Middle wealth quintile 16.17% 16.94% 18.26% 18.52% 
Richer wealth quintile 19.24% 18.19% 23.51% 23.83% 
Richest wealth quintile 11.43% 13.06% 20.51% 12.95% 
N. observations 2292 1007 8206 1036 
Note: weighted samples. Mean and % displayed, std. Dev. In (), excluding early 
adopters. 
2 The wealth index is derived by ZIMSTAT using principal component anal-
ysis from the number and kinds of consumer goods households own such as 
television, bicycle or car, and housing characteristics such as source of drinking 
water, toilet facilities, and flooring materials (The DHS Program, 2016).  
3 The DHS program introduces displacement, “a process of systematically 
introducing error to GPS coordinates data by “shifting” the coordinates under 
set parameters”. Whilst urban clusters are displayed a distance up to 2 km, rural 
clusters are displaced a distance up to 5 km, with an additional random 1% of 
rural clusters being displaced at a distance up to 10 km (United States Agency 
for International Development, 2013). 
4 We choose conception rather than the delivery date to capture the wide RBF 
package as mothers may have been exposed to RBF even prior to the birth of 
their child (e.g. the programme incentivises ANC visits).  
5 Although all health facilities located in an RBF district were “treated”, 
mothers living in a district border could go to a health facility in a non-RBF 
district. 
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analyses. 
To address potential endogeneity at the facility level, we include 
health facility fixed effects, μh, and we exclude border health facilities in 
a sensitivity analysis. To control for selection at the household level, we 
include a rich set of control variables, captured by the vector Xit . We also 
include survey year, conception year and month dummies to account for 
systematic changes in health outcomes and service delivery as well as for 
seasonality and cohort effects. εidt is a random error clustered at the 
district level. Our DiD coefficient of interest is β which captures the ef-
fect of the introduction of RBF on our outcomes of interest. 
4.2. Identification 
For β to measure the effect of RBF on health outcomes and service 
delivery, we must assume that the trend in outcomes prior to the 
introduction of RBF was similar between mothers who conceive in the 
implementation period of the relevant RBF district and those who do 
not. While this assumption can never be formally tested, we verified that 
trends in a number of outcomes were similar between the exposed and 
unexposed groups prior to the introduction of RBF. To test this “common 
trend” assumption, we estimate the following model: 
yidt = α + β(Treat × Phase)d + γXit + δt + μh + εidt (2) 
The outcome yidt measures key child health (mortality and birth 
weight) and service delivery outcomes (institutional delivery C-section, 
ANC visits and immunisation). Phase, is equal to one if district d has 
adopted RBF and zero otherwise, and is interacted with the conception 
date indicated by Treat. Equation (2) is estimated for conceptions 
occurring prior to the introduction of the second RBF phase, March 1, 
2012, for mid adopting districts, and prior to the third RBF phase, July 1, 
2014, for late adopting districts. We control for the same variables as in 
equation (1). We are interested in β measuring whether health outcomes 
and service delivery of mother i at time t located in mid- (late) adopting 
districts are significantly different from all other mothers not conceiving 
at that time and those in late (mid) adopting districts. We then plot the β 
coefficients for each outcome variable and use standard errors to display 
the 95% confidence intervals. Our hypothesis is that health outcomes 
and service delivery have similar trends and thus β should not be sta-
tistically significantly different from zero. 
A second assumption is that there are no spillovers, that is, mothers 
in late adopting districts do not visit health facilities located in a nearby 
RBF intervention district. As we do not follow the same mothers over 
time, we cannot test this assumption directly. Instead, we run the ana-
lyses excluding those health facilities that are close (within a 5 Km 
radius) to the border of a treated district as a robustness check. 
A final assumption for β to reliably measure the effect of the RBF 
programme on outcomes is that no other interventions were imple-
mented in any of the districts at the same time as RBF that independently 
impacted on outcomes. We test for this by re-estimating equation (1) 
randomly excluding one of the 60 districts each time. 
4.3. Additional analyses 
To explore the heterogenous effects of RBF on health outcomes by 
wealth and education we estimate models of child mortality and service 
delivery using equation (1) for two sub-groups: i) richest households 
with wealth in the top two quintiles and relatively poorer ones with 
wealth in the bottom three quintiles; and ii) households with the edu-
cation of the mother is above and below the median. 
We check whether our results are sensitive to a number of specifi-
cations. We re-estimate equation (1) with RBFd equal to one if delivery 
date (rather than conception date) is on or after district d has introduced 
RBF. 
We then examine whether the effects of RBF differ by the different 
phases of its introduction. We do so by re-estimating equation (1) where 
RBFd is no longer a dummy but a vector corresponding to the two later 
phases of the programme (and excluding the early adopters): i) RBF in 
March 2012 is equal to one if the conception date is on or after the 
second phase of the programme; and ii) RBF in July 2014 is equal to one 
if the conception date is on or after the third phase of the programme. 
We also check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of early 
adopter districts, and to non-linear specifications such as the logit 
Fig. 3. Map of health facilities and households by district.  
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We find that RBF reduced under-five mortality by two percentage 
points (40% of the pre-treatment mean) but find no detectable effect on 
infant and neonatal mortality (Column 1 of Table 4). We find no evi-
dence of an effect of the RBF programme on birth weight, height for age, 
weight for age or weight-for height z scores (Table A1). 
In relation to the incentivised indicators, RBF led to an increase in 
the rate of institutional deliveries by seven percentage points (about 
10% of the pre-treatment mean) (Table 5), but a three-percentage point 
reduction in the rate of C-sections (over 50% of the pre-treatment 
mean). There was no evidence of an effect on any other incentivised 
indicators such as four ANC visits, full immunisation (Table 5) or TT +
vaccination, HIV testing, family planning, PNC and Vitamin A delivery 
(Tables A2-3). 
We find some heterogeneity in outcomes based on wealth and 
education (Tables 6–9). In column (1) of Table 6 we show that under- 
five mortality decreased by 2.7 percentage points for those in the rich-
est two quintiles but there was no effect among poorer households. 
Under-five mortality also decreased by 2.1 percentage points for 
mothers with education above the median (Column 1 of Table 8). 
Although there was no average treatment effect on infant mortality, RBF 
resulted in a 3.8 and 5.9 percentage point reduction among the poorest 
quintiles and mothers with education below the median (Column 2 in 
Tables A4-5). The programme resulted in a 9.4 percentage point increase 
in institutional deliveries among poorer households, with no effect 
among those in the richest quintiles (Column 2 in Table 7). 
When examining the assumptions underpinning our analysis, we find 
that there is no difference in the trends of health outcomes and health 
services prior to the introduction of RBF between mothers who will be 
exposed and those who will not (Fig. 4), with the exception of four or 
more ANC visits, where coverage was higher in 2008 and 2009 in mid- 
and late-adopting districts. 
We find similar results for under five mortality and institutional 
delivery rates when we excluded border facilities (Column 1 of 
Table 4 
RBF effects on child mortality.   

































































































































No. Observations 12,325 11,866 8444 
Weighted samples. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district-level. RBF 
is a dummy equal to one if conception date is on or after the time when district 
d introduced Results-Based Financing. Neonatal mortality refers to mortality at 
birth and infant mortality refers to mortality under 12 months. All models 
include province dummies, health facilities dummies, survey year, conception 
year and month dummies. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
Table 5 
RBF effects on health service delivery.   





















































































































































































12,325 12,316 12,204 6771 
Weighted sample. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district-level. RBF 
is a dummy equal to one if conception date is on or after the time when district 
d introduced Results-Based Financing. All models include province dummies, 
health facilities dummies, survey year, conception year and month dummies. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Appendix Tables A6-7). The effect is not statistically significant because 
of the reduced sample size compared to the main models. When 
excluding districts in a random stepwise manner, we find very similar 
results as previously reported, suggesting that there are unlikely to be 
concurrent interventions affecting outcomes within districts (Fig. 5). 
When using delivery date rather than conception date to determine 
the timing of exposure to RBF, the reduction in under five mortality 
increases from 2 to 2.6 percentage points, and we observe a significant 
reduction in neonatal and infant mortality by almost two and three 
percentage points respectively (Columns 1–3 in Table A8). 
The RBF programme effects generally appear to be stronger earlier in 
the implementation process, with effects on under five mortality and 
institutional deliveries among mid adopters only being statistically sig-
nificant during the Second phase (March 2012) (Column 1 of Tables A9- 
10). The one exception is c-section rates, which were only found to 
reduce significantly in the Third phase of the programme, from July 
2014 (Column 2 of Table A10). 
Our results are generally robust to variations in the model specifi-
cation, including when early adopting districts are added to the sample 
(Tables A11-12) and the use of logit models (available on request). 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
We analysed the effect of Zimbabwe’s national RBF programme on 
child health and service delivery outcomes. We find that RBF led to a 
reduction in under five mortality by two percentage points, an effect 
which was concentrated in households with the highest levels of wealth 
and education. We do not find any effect of RBF on child anthropometric 
measures. When we define exposure to RBF by the delivery rather than 
conception date, we find reductions in neonatal and infant mortality.6 
When exposure is defined by delivery, we have enough power to detect 
an effect higher than the minimum detectable effect size (MDE). How-
ever, we do not have enough power to detect the effect size we report for 
infant and neonatal mortality when exposure is defined at contracep-
tion, meaning that we might make a Type II error (see Table A.13). 
Although RBF was a package of care starting before birth, these results 
may still suggest that incentivised activities at or after birth were most 
effective. As potentially supporting evidence of this, we find an increase 
in the rate of institutional deliveries and a reduction in the rate of C- 
sections, but no changes in any other elements of the programme such as 
Table 6 
RBF effects on child mortality by wealth.   
Under five mortality Neonatal mortality 





















































































































































5079 7246 4918 6948 
Weighted samples. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district-level. RBF 
is a dummy equal to one if conception date is on or after the time when district 
d introduced Results-Based Financing. Neonatal mortality refers to mortality at 
birth. All models include province dummies, health facilities dummies, survey 
year, conception year and month dummies. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
Table 7 
RBF effects on health service delivery by wealth.   
Institutional delivery C-section 



















































































































































5079 7246 5075 7241 
Weighted samples. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district-level. RBF 
is a dummy equal to one if conception date is on or after the time when district 
d introduced Results-Based Financing. All models include province dummies, 
health facilities dummies, survey year, conception year and month dummies. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
6 We note that seven percent of mothers are categorised as treated using the 
conception date definition, lower than the eleven percent of treated mothers 
using the delivery date definition. 
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the timing, frequency or content of ANC, or on PNC, family planning or 
immunisation services. When considering programme effects over time, 
we found that effects were only observed during the second phase of the 
programme (March 2012) with the exception of c-sections, which only 
reduced in the longer term. 
Our results on the impact of RBF in Zimbabwe differ somewhat from 
that of a previous evaluation by the World Bank (2016). While our 
studies are similar in estimating a positive effect on deliveries, we find 
much smaller effect sizes (7 percentage points versus 13). Our finding is 
actually similar to the Cambodia study by van de Poel et al. (2016) 
reporting a 6.9 percentage points increase in deliveries. However, our 
findings differ from Gertler et al., (2013) who have found positive effects 
of the Rwandan pay for performance scheme on weight-for-age z-score 
and height for age. Our results also differ from Peabody et al. (2014) 
who have analysed the randomisation of a pay for performance scheme 
in the Philippines, finding a nine-percentage points improvement in 
age-adjusted wasting. In addition, whilst the previous evaluation re-
ported a positive effect on C-sections, we find a substantial negative 
effect. The previous evaluation also reported a decrease in the per-
centage of children who are severely underweight or stunted (<3sd) 
however, we detected no effects on these outcomes. There are several 
reasons for these differences. One could be the longer time frame of our 
study, as we estimated effects for an additional year. Evidence from 
higher income settings suggests that effects of incentives can reduce over 
time as providers get used to them (Kristensen et al., 2014). We also rely 
on a much larger sample of households exploiting information from 60 
districts across the country compared to 32 in the previous evaluation. 
Finally, from April to June 2014 the programme experienced imple-
mentation challenges such as delays in disbursements, and staff short-
ages among the purchasing agency Cordaid resulting in reduced 
oversight of RBF (Brown et al., 2020). This may also have limited pro-
gramme effects on content of care indicators relying on the availability 
of medical supplies and drugs (Brown et al., 2020). 
Some might be surprised by the finding that RBF reduced the rate of 
C-sections and had no effect on family planning, although these activ-
ities were heavily rewarded within the RBF scheme. The increased rate 
Table 8 
RBF effects on child mortality by education.   
Under five mortality Neonatal mortality 















































































































































































6753 5573 6562 5304 
Weighted samples. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district-level. RBF 
is a dummy equal to one if conception date is on or after the time when district 
d introduced Results-Based Financing. Neonatal mortality refers to mortality at 
birth. All models include province dummies, health facilities dummies, survey 
year, conception year and month dummies. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
Table 9 
RBF effects on health service delivery by education.   
Institutional delivery C-section 















































































































































































6753 5573 6749 5568 
Weighted sample. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at district-level. RBF 
is a dummy equal to one if conception date is on or after the time when district 
d introduced Results-Based Financing. All models include province dummies, 
health facilities dummies, survey year, conception year and month dummies. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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of institutional deliveries is driven by increased use of primary care fa-
cilities (which do not have capacity to perform C-sections and are not 
rewarded for them) rather than hospital facilities. There is also evidence 
of providers delaying onwards referral of women in order to benefit from 
the delivery incentive at their facility (Brown et al., 2020). In terms of 
family planning, qualitative evidence suggests that some providers 
refused to offer services for religious reasons or due to a lack of appro-
priate training (Brown et al., 2020; World Bank, Cordaid and Ministry of 
Health and Child Care, 2013). Moreover, some providers perceived that 
the level of effort required to reach family planning targets was too high, 
and decided to prioritise other services (Brown et al., 2020). 
The increase in institutional deliveries among the poorest groups and 
least educated may be explained by a concurrent national law to remove 
user fees (not part of the formal RBF scheme), although there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that fees were renamed and variably 
used at clinics rather than completely eliminated (Kadungure et al., 
2021). Many clinics built mother huts to increase their maternity ward 
and purchased new equipment, using their facility bonus (Brown et al., 
2020). Pro-poor effects on deliveries have also been reported in 
Tanzania where exemptions were in place (Binyaruka et al., 2018). 
However, pro-rich effects on deliveries were reported in Burundi 
(Bonfrer et al., 2014), Rwanda (Lannes et al., 2016) and Cambodia (van 
Fig. 4. Common trend tests of health outcomes and service delivery. 
Note: Weighted samples. Coefficients from linear models of exposure to RBF on each health outcome and service delivery prior to the introduction of RBF in March 
2012 for mid-adopters and in July 2014 for late-adopters, excluding early adopters. Dashed lines represent 95% CI. 
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de Poel et al., 2016), where user fees or transport costs were found to be 
barriers to access. 
In the wider literature positive effects on facility deliveries are 
frequently reported (Anselmi et al., 2017; Basinga P. et al., 2011; van de 
Poel et al., 2016; Gertler and Vermeersch, 2013; Bonfrer et al., 2014, 
2014b) with evidence related to other measures such as ANC, vaccina-
tion, contraception or use of outpatient care being much less consistent 
(De Walque et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2011). There is some evidence in 
other settings that incentivised services may not improve as a result of 
RBF depending on the wider context they operate in and when they 
require the greatest effort by providers (Schuster et al., 2018; Basinga 
et al., 2011; Lannes et al., 2016; Das et al., 2016; van de Poel et al., 
2016). 
Our study is among the few to provide evidence on the effect of RBF 
on mortality reduction. The study by van de Poel et al. (2016) found no 
statistically significant effect of payment for performance on mortality 
for all births reported by the mother in the last 10 years prior to the 
interview. A study in Brazil (Vinuela, 2015) examines differences in 
municipality-level under-five mortality and finds improvements due to 
RBF and a study in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Huillery and 
Seban, 2021) finds a deterioration in neonatal mortality. The scheme in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo is reasonably similar to RBF in 
Zimbabwe – focusing primarily on service volumes in primary care fa-
cilities. Huillery and Seban (2021) hypothesise that the increase in 
Fig. 5. Coefficients of linear models randomly excluding a district at a time. 
Note: Weighted samples. Coefficients from 60 Difference-in-Differences linear models of RBF effect on each health outcomes and service delivery (black diamonds). 
Horizonal grey bars represent 95% CI. 
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neonatal mortality is due to facilities reducing prices to attract patients, 
which reduced the perceived benefit of healthcare as well as demand for 
care. 
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, several outcome measures 
are self-reported. Thus, our results may be biased to the extent to which 
mother responses are related to the RBF introduction conditional on the 
controlled socio-economic characteristics. Secondly, we do not have 
information on health facility characteristics. However, to the extent to 
which these characteristics are time-invariant, these are captured by the 
health facility fixed effects. Thirdly, we do not observe exposure, as we 
do not know which health facility was utilised by households. Further-
more, the DHS geocoordinates that were used to match households to 
facilities are displaced to preserve respondent anonymity. As RBF was 
implemented at the district-level, we are less concerned about mistak-
enly assigning households to non-RBF health facilities for as long as 
health facilities are not located near a district border. As a further check, 
we find that results are robust to removing households close to facilities 
at districts borders. 
To conclude, we find that RBF reduces under-five mortality and 
neonatal and infant mortality (when exposure is defined by the delivery 
date), with improvements being concentrated in households with higher 
socio-economic status. We find improvements in facility-based delivery 
among poorer and less educated groups. To address external validity 
concerns, further evidence from other settings is needed. 
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